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THE VOICE: THE MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDER’S PERSPECTIVE 
Dov Solomon* 
Minority shareholders tend not to participate in the decision-making process 
of public companies with a controlling shareholder, and their voice is rarely 
heard. Even when they disagree with how the company is being managed, they 
prefer to express this dissatisfaction by selling their shares rather than by ex-
pressing their voice. Contrary to the prevailing view, this article provocatively 
suggests that their voice is important and desirable. On the deontological level, it 
asserts that shareholder voice has an intrinsic value that is independent of any 
utility it may yield. Corporate democracy and, specifically, minority shareholder 
suffrage, legitimizes the exercise of power by the public corporation’s insiders: 
the controlling shareholder, directors, and managers. Indeed, the shareholder’s 
right to vote is the foundation upon which the public corporation is constructed 
and sustained. On the utilitarian level, this article argues that shareholder suf-
frage is efficient because it reduces agency costs and contributes to the develop-
ment of financial markets. Given the prevalence of controlled companies, the 
unique insights in this article can serve as an important normative basis for poli-
cymakers in designing reforms aimed at incentivizing minority shareholders to 
exercise their voting rights and use their voice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In most countries, concentrated ownership is the common firm ownership 
structure.1 Even in the United States, where public companies are generally 
widely held, the number of controlled companies is steadily rising due to the 
growing tendency of firms to adopt a dual-class share structure.2 This structure 
enables a company’s founders to hold the majority of voting rights and en-
trench their control of the company even after it goes public. The trend of mul-
tiple-share classes gained steam in 2004 when Google decided to go public 
with a dual-class share structure, granting its co-founders, executive manage-
ment team, and directors 61.4 percent of the voting power.3 In the years that 
have followed, the multiple-share capital structure has become the norm in Sili-
con Valley among many hi-tech companies such as Facebook.4 
                                                
1  Most corporations in Europe, Asia, and Latin America have controlling shareholders. See, 
e.g., MARCO BECHT & COLIN MAYER, Introduction to THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE 
1, 18 (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2001) (finding that in 50 percent of non-financial 
listed companies in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Italy, a single blockholder controls 
more than 50 percent of voting rights, while in 50 percent of Dutch, Spanish, and Swedish 
companies, a single blockholder controls more than 43.5 percent, 34.5 percent, and 34.9 per-
cent of votes, respectively); Stijn Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control 
in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 81–82 (2000) (finding that more than two-
thirds of East-Asian firms are controlled by a single shareholder); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. 
Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 
378–83 (2002) (noting that only around 37 percent of Western European firms are widely 
held); Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 491–97 
(1999) (finding from a review of large corporations in twenty-seven countries that relatively 
few firms are widely held); Borja Larrain & Francisco Urzúa I., Controlling Shareholders 
and Market Timing in Share Issuance, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 661, 661 (2013). 
2  Kobi Kastiel, Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled Companies, 2016 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 101, 110 (2016). 
3  Letter from Larry Page & Sergey Brin, 2004 Founders’ IPO Letter: “An Owner’s Manual” 
for Google’s Shareholders, https://abc.xyz/investor/founders-letters/2004/ipo-letter.html 
[https://perma.cc/5YQK-LMHP] (last visited Feb. 27, 2017). 
4  Jeff Green & Ari Levy, Zuckerberg Stock Grip Becomes New Normal in Silicon Valley, 
BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2012), http://www.newsmax.com/Finance/InvestingAnalysis/Zucker 
berg-Stock-Normal-valley/2012/05/07/id/438187/ [https://perma.cc/XNE4-LSTS] (quoting 
Lise Buyer, principal at Class V Group in Portola Valley, California, “It may be everybody 
tries [a dual-class structure], because the market seems to be giving everyone a pass.”). 
17 NEV. L.J. 739 SOLOMON - FINAL.DOCX 5/10/17  2:54 PM 
Summer 2017] THE VOICE 741 
In a firm with concentrated ownership, there is a major shareholder who 
can direct the company’s affairs, known as a controlling shareholder. Studies 
show a prominent presence of companies with controlling shareholders in the 
United States.5 Concentrated ownership does not refer only to companies in 
which the controlling shareholder holds the majority of voting rights, however. 
Due to retail shareholders’ rational apathy, which is examined in Part II of this 
article, the controlling shareholder exerts effective control over the company’s 
affairs even if she holds less than 50 percent of the voting rights. 
The standard approach in corporate law is that different governance rules 
should be designed for different ownership structures.6 It is therefore surprising 
that the phenomenon of shareholder rational apathy, which is discussed exten-
sively in the literature regarding widely held firms,7 has yet to be explored in 
the context of public companies with concentrated ownership. This article 
seeks to fill the gap in the academic literature by offering an analytical founda-
tion for investigating minority shareholder rational apathy in companies with a 
controlling shareholder. 
The inherent risk with concentrated ownership is that the controlling share-
holder will exploit her power to derive private benefit at the expense of retail 
shareholders.8 This can be achieved in a variety of ways, for example, through 
self-dealing transactions.9 Directing company activities with the motive of pri-
vate benefit and at the expense of minority shareholders leads to inefficiency 
that causes damage to both investors and the economy as a whole. This phe-
nomenon is described in the literature as an agency problem between the mi-
                                                
5  See, e.g., Ronald C. Anderson et al., Founders, Heirs, and Corporate Opacity in the Unit-
ed States, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 205, 207 (2008) (analyzing the 2000 largest industrial U.S. firms 
and finding that founder-controlled firms constitute 22.3 percent and heir-controlled firms 
comprise 25.3 percent, with average equity stakes of approximately 18 percent and 22 per-
cent, respectively); Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, Founding-Family Ownership 
and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500, 58 J. FIN. 1301, 1302 (2003) (finding 
that one-third of S&P-500 companies have families as controlling shareholders); Clifford G. 
Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 
1382 (2009) (finding in a sample of 375 U.S. public firms that 96 percent of them have 
shareholders who own at least 5 percent of the firm’s common stock. The average size of the 
largest block of ownership in those 360 firms is 26 percent). 
6  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Stand-
ards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1267–68 (2009). 
7  See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 
524, 585 (1990). 
8  See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and 
Control (Harvard Law Sch., Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research & Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., 
Working Paper No. 7203, 1999), http://ssrn.com/abstract=168990 [https://perma.cc/NV33-
SGKK]. 
9  See Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 
430–31 (2008). 
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nority and majority shareholders.10 Controlling shareholders effectively govern 
the firm’s assets and influence decisions made regarding those assets. The mi-
nority is essentially represented by the controller, although their interests are 
not identical and conflicts are likely to arise between them.11 
The agency problem is exacerbated by the minimal involvement of minori-
ty shareholders in the decision-making processes of public companies. Retail 
shareholders tend not to exercise their voting rights at annual general meet-
ings.12 While they are duly invited to the meetings, most refrain from participat-
ing. The cost-benefit analysis explanation for this low rate of shareholder par-
ticipation is that the small number of shares each retail shareholder holds in the 
company makes it impossible for her to substantially influence the decision-
making process; thus, the costs of investor activism are not justified given the 
lack of benefit therefrom. The resulting attitude of retail shareholders regarding 
the company’s decision-making is described as rational apathy.13 Even when 
shareholders disagree with how the company is being managed, they will prefer 
to express this dissatisfaction through exit, i.e., by selling their shares, rather 
than through voice, i.e., by voting at a shareholder meeting with the goal of in-
fluencing the company’s management.14 
Considering rational apathy from an economic cost-benefit perspective 
sheds light on the different measures taken to encourage greater involvement of 
minority shareholders in the decision-making process. The goals of these 
measures are to increase the benefits of participation in shareholder meetings 
and to lower the costs of this activism. First, the greater a shareholder’s poten-
tial degree of influence on the outcome of a vote, the greater her incentive to 
                                                
10  See, e.g., Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental 
Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 117 (2007); Zohar Goshen, Controlling Corporate Agency 
Costs: A United States-Israeli Comparative View, 6 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 100–
01 (1998). 
11  See Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 267, 277–80 (1988). 
12  See Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution 
to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 61–66 (2016) (investigating the total per-
centage of shares that were not voted in each of the matters standing for a vote at S&P 500 
companies in the years 2008–15 and noting that retail investors only vote approximately 30 
percent of the shares they owned); see also BROADRIDGE & PWC INITIATIVE, PROXYPULSE: 
2015 PROXY SEASON WRAP-UP (3d ed. 2015) (analyzing data from 4,280 companies that held 
their annual meetings during the first half of 2015 and finding that retail shareholders voted 
only 28 percent of the shares they owned, while over 97 billion retail shares went unvoted). 
13  ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390–92 (1986). 
14  Empirical studies show that the mere threat of exit will impact management’s conduct for 
the better. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and Share-
holder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2445, 2446 (2009); Alex Ed-
mans, Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia, 64 J. FIN. 2481, 
2484 (2009); Vyacheslav Fos & Charles M. Kahn, Governance Through Threats of Interven-
tion and Exit (July 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2527710 [https://perma.cc/6VKV-BDJC] 
(last visited Jan. 13, 2017); Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate 
Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905 (2016). 
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exercise her voting rights. As opposed to an individual investor, institutional 
investors representing large groups of investors can concentrate their power and 
have a more significant impact on the outcome of a vote in a shareholder meet-
ing. Accordingly, encouraging institutional activism through the active partici-
pation of institutional investors in shareholder meetings is believed to reinforce 
the protection of minority shareholders’ interests.15 Second, reducing the cost of 
voting will increase the willingness of shareholders to participate in the deci-
sion-making process. Efforts to this end are aimed at enabling retail sharehold-
ers to exercise their voting rights without physically attending the general meet-
ing,16 for example, by facilitating online voting.17 Indeed, given the scope of the 
rational apathy problem, the Securities and Exchange Commission has recently 
organized a Proxy Voting Roundtable, aimed at finding ways to increase retail 
shareholder participation in firms’ decision-making.18 
There is a wide assortment of possible avenues for shareholder activism. 
This includes engaging in private discussions or public communication with the 
board of directors and management, conducting publicity campaigns, calling 
for a special shareholder meeting, submitting shareholder resolutions, and even 
initiating litigation. This article’s discussion focuses on the most basic form of 
activism, namely, the exercising of voting rights at shareholder meetings. Bol-
stering the voice of shareholders through their voting rights should, in turn, 
support other forms of shareholder activism, for example, increasing manage-
ment’s willingness to negotiate informally with shareholders prior to the voting 
at the annual meeting.19 
This article does not simply analyze the phenomenon of rational apathy 
and the measures taken to minimize it, but it also seeks to scrutinize the as-
sumptions underlying these measures.20 The normative analysis raises the very 
desirability of corporate democracy and, particularly, minority shareholder in-
volvement in a firm’s decision-making process. This article addresses this 
question from a deontological and utilitarian perspective. The deontological 
                                                
15  See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical 
Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 925–27 (1992). 
16  The European Union has adopted arrangements designed to ensure shareholder access to 
the information relevant to general meetings and to facilitate the exercise of voting rights 
without physically attending the meetings. European Council Directive 2007/36, 2007 O.J. 
(L 184) 17–24 (EC) [hereinafter European Union Directive]. 
17  See generally George Ponds Kobler, Shareholder Voting Over the Internet: A Proposal 
for Increasing Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance, 49 ALA. L. REV. 673, 
674 (1998). 
18  U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PROXY VOTING ROUNDTABLE (Feb. 19, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy-voting-roundtable.shtml [https://perma.cc/XA76-MR8 
N]. 
19  Informal dialogue between institutional investors and corporate management or the board 
is common in England. See Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institu-
tional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2021 (1994). 
20  See infra Part III. 
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discussion focuses on a new and provocative premise: investor participation in 
a firm’s decision-making process has intrinsic value; irrespective of any conse-
quences it may or may not have.21 The main claim is that shareholder suffrage 
is a fundamental right and should therefore be granted special status and protec-
tion under corporate law. Without the mechanisms of corporate democracy and, 
specifically, the shareholder’s right to vote, the exercise of power and control 
by the corporation’s insiders—its controlling shareholder, directors, and man-
agers—is stripped of its legitimacy and ideological foundations.22 Under this 
approach, it is the shareholder’s right to vote that legitimizes the public corpo-
ration as an entity. 
On the utilitarian level, this article examines the influence of shareholder 
involvement on a corporation’s decision-making process and aggregate wel-
fare.23 Corporate democracy ensures that directors and officers are held ac-
countable for their actions.24 Accountability lowers agency costs, since the 
threat of replacement pressures directors and officers to align their interests 
with those of the shareholders. This alignment of interests ultimately leads to 
greater efficiency and increases financial returns.25 Furthermore, active in-
volvement of retail shareholders in a firm’s decision-making process improves 
the quality of the protection of the investment community as a whole, which 
increases investors’ willingness to invest in corporations.26 This, in turn, sup-
ports the development of capital markets and increases the financial resources 
available for production and growth. 
This article also considers three claims commonly raised by opponents of 
corporate democracy:27 (1) the principle of freedom of contract might restrict 
shareholders in exercising their voting rights; (2) retail shareholders are myopic 
and focus on short-term profits that lead to suboptimal results in the long run; 
and (3) retail shareholders lack expertise and have less information than the 
controlling shareholder and managers and, therefore, are likely to support 
suboptimal decisions at the general meeting. The discussion challenges these 
arguments as unconvincing and shows how they cannot justify preventing retail 
shareholders from actively participating at general meetings. 
This article proceeds as follows: Part I explains the agency problem be-
tween the minority and majority shareholders that characterizes concentrated-
ownership companies. Part II then analyzes the causes of shareholder rational 
                                                
21  See infra Part III.B. 
22  See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
23  See infra Part III.C. 
24  Kastiel & Nili, supra note 12, at 60. 
25  See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities 
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 783 (2001). 
26  See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 442 (2001). 
27  See infra Part III.D. 
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apathy, followed by a discussion of the measures generally taken to encourage 
shareholders to exercise their voting rights at general meetings, and distin-
guishes between measures designed to increase the benefits of voting and those 
designed to lower the costs. In Part III, the normative question of whether cor-
porate democracy is desirable is examined, along with the common arguments 
raised against corporate democracy. The final Part concludes the discussion and 
points to the important implications of the analysis for policymakers. 
I.   AGENCY PROBLEMS 
All corporations must contend with agency problems.28 An agency problem 
arises whenever one individual (the agent) manages the interests of another in-
dividual (the principal) in a way that impacts the latter’s property, for the agent 
will generally not treat the principal’s property as she would her own. The con-
cern is that the agent will act in her own best interests rather than in the best in-
terests of the principal. Agency problems are characterized by information 
asymmetries between principals and agents and by conflicts of interest between 
them. This asymmetry is usually mitigated through oversight (i.e., monitoring), 
and conflicts of interest are forestalled by incentive structures that encourage 
the agent to align with the principal’s interests (i.e., bonding).29 Though these 
strategies help to alleviate agency problems, the literature shows that no meth-
od of oversight or incentives actually succeeds at fully eliminating them.30 
There are three different levels of agency problems in a corporation: be-
tween shareholders and managers; between shareholders and the corporation’s 
other constituencies, such as creditors; and between majority and minority 
shareholders, which is the focus of this article.31 Agency problems between the 
two types of shareholders are especially acute in firms with controlling share-
holders, who pose a risk of using their power for their own private gain at the 
expense of retail shareholders. Controlling shareholders, in effect, govern the 
firm’s assets and the decisions made regarding those assets. The minority 
shareholders are represented by the controller, despite their diverging and likely 
conflicting interests.32 For example, contra the interests of other shareholders, a 
controlling shareholder could employ herself and/or family members in the 
                                                
28  For the pioneering work on agency problems, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meck-
ling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. 
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
29  Id. at 308. 
30  See, e.g., Goshen, supra note 10, at 102 n.9. 
31  JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., What is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 1, 
2 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
LAW]. For a presentation of the different levels at which agency problems arise and methods 
for dealing with them, see JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in 
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra, at 35. 
32  Goshen, supra note 10, at 101. 
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company and arrange for excessive salaries. Alternatively, a controller could 
lead the company to engage in a transaction in which she has a personal stake, 
regardless of whether this is in the company’s best interests. In such self-
dealing scenarios, the controlling shareholder derives the private benefits while 
the minority shareholders bear the costs. Managing company activities for pri-
vate benefit at the expense of retail shareholders leads to inefficiency that 
harms investors in the capital market and the economy in general.33 
Both economic and psychological motivations can account for the self-
dealing behavior of controlling shareholders. First, controllers seek to enjoy 
company profits without having to share them with other investors, i.e., in-
crease their personal wealth at the expense of other shareholders.34 Second, 
since in many cases it was the controlling shareholder who created and built the 
company, she tends to relate to it as her private property. Even after the compa-
ny has gone public, the controller will often regard retail shareholders as minor, 
junior partners at best. This makes her likely to continue to feel free to do as 
she pleases with the company’s property. 
Agency problems intensify when there is a significant disparity between 
the controlling shareholder’s equity interests and her voting rights. A low-
equity investment that leads to control increases the potential for conflicts of 
interest between the controller and retail shareholders.35 Take, for example, a 
company in which the controlling shareholder holds 51 percent of the voting 
rights but only 5 percent of the cash-flow rights. For every dollar that the com-
pany produces in profits and distributes as dividends to the shareholders, the 
controller will receive only five cents while ninety-five cents will be divided up 
amongst the other shareholders. In such a situation, the controlling shareholder 
is likely to use her voting power to pass decisions that will increase her person-
al benefit at the expense of retail shareholders. For instance, the controller will 
prefer to use company profits to pay her a higher salary or management fees 
rather than distribute dividends. This illustrates how a disparity between voting 
rights and equity interests is likely to exacerbate conflicts of interest between 
majority and minority shareholders and encourage the controller to act against 
the company’s interests. In addition, empirical studies have shown that this dis-
parity has an adverse effect on company value.36 
                                                
33  Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 26. 
34  For the phenomenon of “tunneling” assets from the firm to the controlling shareholder, 
see Vladimir Atanasov et al., Law and Tunneling, 37 J. CORP. L. 1 (2011); Simon Johnson et 
al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000). 
35  Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups, 27 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 367, 367 (2003). 
36  See, e.g., Stijn Claessens et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of 
Large Shareholdings, 57 J. FIN. 2741 (2002) (finding from data on 1301 publicly-traded cor-
porations in eight East-Asian economies that firm value falls when the control rights of the 
largest shareholder exceed her cash-flow ownership); Karl V. Lins, Equity Ownership and 
Firm Value in Emerging Markets, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 159 (2003) (finding 
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A dual-class share ownership structure creates a gap between voting rights 
and equity rights.37 A company founder who wants to raise capital without re-
linquishing effective control of the company can issue different classes of 
shares, each with different voting rights. The shares issued to the public grant a 
right to residual cash flows, but also grant either inferior voting rights or no 
voting rights at all, while the founders’ shares have superior voting rights. By 
issuing two classes of shares with differentiated voting rights, founders can 
avoid the dilution normally entailed in the initial public offering and hold on to 
most of their voting rights, despite their relatively low equity investment. In 
this way, founders can entrench their control of the company even after it goes 
public. Moreover, a dual-class ownership structure enables founders to pass 
most of the financial risk to the investors while maintaining effective control of 
the company. 
In recent years, multiple-share capital structures have gained in popularity 
amongst Silicon Valley companies.38 They have enabled the founders of tech-
nology companies that went public (such as Google, Facebook, Zynga, 
Groupon, LinkedIn, and Yelp) to retain their control of their companies by issu-
ing special classes of shares that give them more votes than the holders of other 
classes of shares.39 These companies have followed in the footsteps of veteran 
corporations like the New York Times, News Corp., and Viacom, which adopt-
ed the multiple-class share model for their initial public offerings and have for 
decades operated with a concentrated ownership structure.40 
Yet agency problems between the controller and retail shareholders are not 
unique to companies in which the controlling shareholder holds the majority of 
the voting rights. Due to retail shareholders’ rational apathy, which is discussed 
in Part II, the controlling shareholder essentially exerts effective control over 
the company’s affairs even if she holds less than 50 percent of the voting rights. 
The controller can vote her entire block of shares in favor of her own initia-
tives, while the low rate of investor participation in shareholder meetings will 
make blocking such initiatives very difficult or even impossible. Thus, deci-
                                                                                                             
from a sample of 1433 firms from eighteen emerging markets that firm value falls when a 
management group’s control rights exceed its cash flow rights).  
37  Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual Class Equity: 
The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in 
CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000). An alternative 
way to create a gap between voting rights and equity rights is through stock pyramids, that 
is, a chain of companies where each company controls the company beneath it. See id. at 
298. The lower cash-flow interest of the controlling shareholder in companies on the lower 
layers of the pyramid exacerbates the danger that she will use her voting rights to derive per-
sonal benefit at the expense of the company and increases the risk of harm to the investors. 
38  See Green & Levy, supra note 4. 
39  James Surowiecki, Unequal Shares, NEW YORKER (May 28, 2012), http://www.newyork 
er.com/magazine/2012/05/28/unequal-shares [https://perma.cc/W4N3-Z3GL]. 
40  Green & Levy, supra note 4. 
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sions that benefit the controller at the expense of retail shareholders will be ad-
vanced and approved, even though she holds less than 50 percent of the votes. 
II.   RATIONAL APATHY 
A.   Cost-Benefit Analysis 
As explained, agency problems in a concentrated ownership company are 
exacerbated by the low level of investor participation in the firm’s decision-
making process.41 This phenomenon has long been recognized and is the prod-
uct of the separation of ownership and control, which is a dominant feature of 
the modern company.42 The investment of financial resources in a company 
transfers control of these resources from the investors to the company itself, 
which is run by its various agents. Due to the tendency of retail shareholders 
not to make use of their voting rights at annual meetings, the control of the 
company’s assets is essentially concentrated in the hands of the controlling 
shareholder and of management, which is usually appointed by the controller.43 
A simple cost-benefit analysis can shed light on the low levels of retail 
shareholder voting at general meetings of public companies.44 To begin with, a 
public company’s shares are distributed across a large group of investors. This 
diffused distribution means that each individual investor owns only a negligible 
portion of the company. Since voting power at annual meetings is proportionate 
to share ownership, investors holding insignificant portions of shares will have 
no real ability to impact the decision making. This lack of meaningful influence 
on voting outcomes means that individual investors can derive no significant 
benefits from voting and have, therefore, little incentive to vote. 
At the same time, exercising their voting rights entails considerable costs 
for shareholders. To become informed, a shareholder must invest resources in 
collecting information and data about the company and about the specific issue 
up for consideration at the meeting. After gathering the necessary information, 
which can include complex professional and financial documents, the share-
holder must review, process, and understand the data and arrive at an informed 
opinion on how to vote. In addition, the shareholder bears the expense of taking 
time off from work to attend and participate in the shareholder meeting. Each 
of these stages requires an investment of resources by the retail shareholders 
and progressively diminishes their incentive to burden themselves with voting. 
                                                
41  See Black, supra note 7, at 526–29. 
42  For Berle & Means’ seminal work on the separation of ownership and control in public 
companies, see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 127 (1932). 
43  See Bayless Manning, The American Stockholder, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1485–89 (1958) 
(reviewing J.A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER (1958)). 
44  See Black, supra note 7, at 584–91 (discussing rational apathy and shareholder’s incen-
tives to become informed). 
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The minimal potential impact that each retail shareholder can have on vot-
ing outcomes makes the investment required for evaluating resolutions and par-
ticipating in the vote not worthwhile. Shareholders know that even if they de-
vote most of their time and resources to preparing for the annual meeting, they 
will not be able to influence the decision-making process. Thus, each individual 
investor, acting rationally to maximize her benefits, conducts a cost-benefit 
analysis and concludes that the costs of participating in the general meeting are 
greater than the personal benefit to be gained. As a consequence, she chooses 
not to undertake the burdens of voting and generally abstain from the compa-
ny’s decision-making process. This behavior is what is commonly referred to as 
rational apathy.45 
A simple example can illustrate this rational apathy. Say that two alterna-
tive courses of action are to be voted on at a company’s annual shareholder 
meeting. A thorough analysis of each alternative should lead to the conclusion 
that the first course of action will yield higher expected returns, by $200,000. 
Susan owns one share of a total of 100,000 shares issued by the company, and 
she knows that her vote will be worth only 1/100,000 (or 0.001 percent) of the 
total vote at the annual meeting. Additionally, she estimates her personal costs 
for gathering and processing the information required for an informed decision 
and vote to be $1,500. This cost is much higher than her expected private bene-
fit of two dollars if the better course of action is taken ($200,000/100,000, 
which is her share of the total value that would be gained by the firm). Clearly, 
Susan, a rational shareholder, would refrain from the costs involved in voting at 
the annual meeting. 
The passivity that characterizes shareholders also stems from the diversifi-
cation of their investment portfolios. Given the risks of investing in a single 
company, investors tend to spread their capital market investments across many 
different companies.46 Diversification neutralizes the dependence on the per-
formance of a particular company, but it also diminishes the incentive to be in-
volved in the affairs of any one company. Moreover, from a practical perspec-
tive, a diversified investment makes it impossible for shareholders to be 
involved in all of the many companies they invest in, even if they should wish 
to do so. 
The troubling effect of rational apathy is that decisions passed at general 
meetings might not reflect the views of the investors. This has serious conse-
quences in companies with a controlling shareholder with less than 50 percent 
of the voting rights. Even though the public investors hold the majority of the 
voting rights, their voices are not heard. 
                                                
45  See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 13 (discussing rational apathy problem). 
46  See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 196–98 (10th ed. 
2011). 
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B.   Managing Rational Apathy 
Understanding that cost-benefit considerations deter investors from partici-
pating in shareholder meetings is key to identifying effective methods to coun-
ter this. The different modes of dealing with rational apathy can be classified 
into two categories: methods for increasing the benefit to shareholders from ex-
ercising their voting rights and methods for mitigating shareholders’ costs of 
voting participation. 
1.   Increasing the Benefits of Voting 
Clearly, in a public company, an individual investor’s low proportion of 
ownership means she has little ability to influence the company’s decision-
making process and voting outcomes in the general meeting. A coordinated 
group of investors, in contrast, could concentrate their voting rights in a con-
certed effort. However, the economic literature on collective action problems 
shows that the costs of organizing investors are too high for this to work.47 
One possible way to lower the costs of association among investors is to 
obligate institutional investors, who represent large groups of individual inves-
tors, to vote at shareholder meetings. Financial institutional investors such as 
pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds play an important role 
in developed capital markets around the world. This stems from the fact that 
they manage public funds on a large scale and conduct much of the activity in 
capital markets. Institutional investors in the United States manage huge pub-
lic-asset portfolios, which have steadily grown from year to year. The amount 
of financial assets held by pension funds, mutual funds, and life insurance 
companies increased, respectively, from approximately $14.9, $8.9, and $5.3 
trillion in 2011 to $17.9, $12.9, and $6.3 trillion in 2015.48 A similar trend of 
significant growth in financial assets held by institutional investors has been 
observed in other OECD (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) member countries as well.49  
Moreover, financial institutions play a central role in capital markets. The 
proportion of institutional investor ownership in United States public compa-
nies jumped from about 10 percent in 1953 to over 60 percent by the end of 
2005.50 This trend continued to accelerate during the last decade, so that in the 
                                                
47  See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971). 
48  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: 
FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS (First 
Quarter 2016) 90, 92, 99 tbls.L116, L117 & L122 (2016). 
49  See generally OECD, INSTITUTIONAL INV. ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, http://stats.oecd.org/In 
dex.aspx?DataSetCode=QASA_7II [https://perma.cc/288W-DHDR] (last visited Mar. 18, 
2017). 
50  Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United 
States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 57 fig.1 (2007). 
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first half of 2015, “institutional investors held 68% of the shares of U.S. public 
companies.”51 Similarly, in other OECD countries, the holdings of institutional 
investors in public companies have risen significantly over the years.52 
The massive investment of financial institutions in public company stocks 
affords them the ability to exercise shareholder influence on firm decision-
making. Unlike an individual private investor, an institutional investor’s signif-
icant portion of the company’s shares gives it far greater voting power at share-
holder meetings. Moreover, its relatively higher proportion of ownership re-
duces the attractiveness of selling its shares on the stock market in the event of 
dissatisfaction with the company’s management. A massive exit would lead to 
a steep drop in share prices and financial loss for the institutional investor.53 
Therefore, continuing to hold on to shares and using its voice to influence the 
decision-making process is the more attractive option for the institutional inves-
tor. 
Institutional investors’ duty of care obligates them to protect the interests 
of their clients by participating in shareholder meetings and exercising their 
voting rights.54 Moreover, their special status in the capital markets prevents 
them from limiting their activities to passive investment in public companies. 
In light of the vast scope of the assets they manage, the market in its entirety is 
furthered by institutional activism, as manifested in the institutions’ active par-
ticipation in shareholder meetings and involvement in the supervision of public 
companies they are invested in. 
The call for institutional activism reflects the view of institutional actors as 
an instrument for effective oversight over public companies. This approach ex-
presses the preference for market mechanisms over governmental intervention. 
Accordingly, financial institutions should develop effective tools that enable 
them to achieve the supervisory goal of institutional activism in the capital 
market. In addition to voting at annual shareholder meetings, institutional in-
vestors can be active in other areas, such as in financial institutions’ investment 
policymaking where greater weight can be given to corporate governance con-
                                                
51  BROADRIDGE & PWC INITIATIVE, supra note 12, at 2. 
52  In the United Kingdom, the increase in institutional investor holdings in public companies 
over the last fifty years has led to a decrease in the proportion of retail shareholder holdings, 
from 54 percent in 1963 to 11 percent in 2012. Serdar Çelik & Mats Isaksson, Institutional 
Investors and Ownership Engagement, 2013/2 OECD J.: FIN. MKT. TRENDS 93, 96 (2014). 
Similarly, in Japan, in 2011, institutional investors held the majority of public company 
stock, whereas retail shareholders held only 18 percent of all public equity. Id. 
53  See Black, supra note 7, at 572–73; John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The 
Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1288–89 (1991); Ed-
ward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 
79 GEO. L.J. 445, 462–63 (1991). 
54  Press Release No. IA-2106; SEC, Final Rule: Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 17 
C.F.R. Part 275 (Mar. 10, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2106.htm [https://perm 
a.cc/78DN-7YCN]. 
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siderations,55 in selecting the members of the board of directors in the compa-
nies in which they hold shares, and in initiating derivative and class actions.56 
One striking example of institutional investor activism is the involvement of 
the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) in the af-
fairs of the public companies in which it invests.57 Overall, institutional activ-
ism upholds and safeguards the norms of corporate governance, protects the in-
terests of public investors, and generally contributes to the improved 
functioning of the capital market.58 
2.   Lowering the Costs of Voting 
Time and mobility limitations make it cumbersome for retail shareholders 
to participate in general meetings and exercise their voting rights, especially 
given that they often diversify their investments across many companies. Since 
the annual meetings of different public companies can be held simultaneously, 
it becomes impossible for investors to be physically present at the meetings of 
all. Furthermore, in the global age, when investment opportunities are not re-
stricted to the investor’s country of origin, physical attendance at meetings is 
not feasible in many cases. 
To ease the burden of voting for the investment community, voting options 
that do not require physical attendance have been developed. For example, it is 
possible for shareholders to vote via proxy. Regulation of the proxy solicitation 
process is one of the original responsibilities that Congress assigned to the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,59 
                                                
55  If institutional investors include the quality of corporate governance among their overall 
considerations in choosing the companies they invest in, this should directly increase the 
demand for good corporate governance as well as effectively force public companies to im-
prove their governance policies in order to raise capital from such investors. 
56  For the appropriateness of institutional investors as litigants in class actions, see Elliott J. 
Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors 
Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995). 
57  For empirical research on the influence of CalPERS’ activist policies, see Michael P. 
Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 
227 (1996). For a description of the activism policies of CalPERS, see Governance, 
CALPERS, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/governance [https://perma.cc/SGX 
2-DELU] (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
58  A general approach of institutional activism was recently adopted in the English Steward-
ship Code. See generally FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (Sept. 
2012), https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Steward 
ship-Code-September-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/CU5K-NY7S]. The Code sets forth a host 
of governing principles for the engagement between financial institutions and the companies 
in which they invest and applies a “comply or explain” mechanism under which institutions 
are encouraged to adopt these principles or else explain why they choose not to. Id. at 4. 
59  For Fisch’s analysis on the history of the SEC’s efforts to regulate the proxy process since 
1934, see Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 
VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1188–91 (1993). 
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and over the years, the Commission has developed detailed proxy rules.60 In 
addition, in order to provide shareholders with a convenient method of voting, 
the major national securities exchanges generally require their listed companies 
“to solicit proxies for all meetings of shareholders.”61 
However, the shareholder meeting is not only a voting forum, but also a fo-
rum of discussion, debate, and persuasion. Consequently, in not being present 
at the meeting and using a proxy instead, a shareholder misses the opportunity 
to change her mind or convince others during the meeting.62 Nonetheless, due 
to the costs involved in physically attending meetings and the resulting nega-
tive incentive to participate in the vote, many legal systems allow voting by 
proxy, despite its obvious shortcomings, as the lesser of two evils.63 The signif-
icant benefits of the proxy system, described as giving “true vitality to the con-
cept of corporate democracy,”64 far outweigh its disadvantages.65 
Facilitated by technological advances, an additional voting option has 
emerged: electronic online voting.66 The internet provides a convenient infra-
structure for increasing shareholder participation in corporate decision-making 
processes. Internet technology offers public companies an alternative way to 
communicate with their shareholders and enables the creation of an online fo-
rum for shareholder meetings, which cuts shareholders’ costs of participation. 
                                                
60  See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 240.14b-2. 
61  See, e.g., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 402.04(A), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/ 
LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_5&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Fl
cm-sections%2F [https://perma.cc/BT2J-2TUT] (last visited Mar. 19, 2017); NASDAQ 
LISTING RULE § 5620(b), http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/nasdaqtools/platformviewer.asp? 
selectednode=chp_1_1_1_1&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F 
[https://perma.cc/7EJR-6B7V] (last visted Mar. 19, 2017). 
62  A distinction should be made between two types of voting rights. The shareholder’s vot-
ing right is a property right that belongs to the shareholder herself, and she is thus free to ex-
ercise it by forgoing the advantages of attending a shareholder meeting in person. The voting 
rights of members of parliament or of a firm’s board of directors, in contrast, are not proper-
ty rights, but rather empower their bearers to act on behalf of others; they are therefore not 
free to relinquish these advantages. 
63  See, e.g., 8 DEL. CODE § 212(b) (2002); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 7.22(2) 
(Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2005); Canada Business Corporations Act, 1985, c.44, Part 13, §§ 147–
54 (R.S.C. 1985), http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-44.pdf [https://perma.cc/492X-
BQ3Z]; Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex [German Corporate Governance Code], 
§ 2.3.3 (May 2015); European Union Directive, supra note 16, at § 10; Companies Law, 
5759-1999, SH No. 189 § 83 (1999) (Isr.). 
64  Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated, 404 
U.S. 403 (1972) (“It is obvious to the point of banality to restate the proposition that Con-
gress intended by its enactment of section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to give 
true vitality to the concept of corporate democracy.”). 
65  But see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 1347, 1348 (2011) (arguing that “proxy access would have some undesirable ef-
fects . . . and some desirable effects . . . . None of these effects is likely to be very material, 
and the net effect is likely to be close to zero.”). 
66  See Kobler, supra note 17. 
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Costs are reduced because the internet is an effective and inexpensive means 
for transferring data, including documents, and for conducting personal and 
group communication among shareholders. 
Public companies in the United States and elsewhere have begun voluntari-
ly adopting mechanisms that allow shareholders to vote in annual meetings via 
the internet.67 Moreover, in 2007, the European Union advised its member 
states to promote the use of electronic voting systems in public companies in 
order to raise participation and voting rates of the investing community in gen-
eral meetings.68 
A pioneer in implementing a mandatory electronic voting system for 
shareholder meetings has been Turkey, which, in 2012, passed regulations re-
quiring all companies trading publicly on the Istanbul Stock Exchange to allow 
shareholders to vote using such a system.69 These regulations were developed 
as part of the Turkish government’s efforts to turn Istanbul into a regional fi-
nancial center.70 The ability to vote at shareholder meetings from anywhere in 
the world through a simple internet connection removes entry barriers for for-
eign investors. Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”) 
has also progressed toward implementing a mandatory electronic voting system 
for public companies.71 Since October 2012, the top 500 listed companies on 
the Bombay Stock Exchange and National Stock Exchange are required to al-
low investors to exercise their voting rights through an electronic voting sys-
tem.72 Recently, the Israel Securities Authority (“ISA”) also launched an elec-
tronic voting system designed to protect investor interests, which facilitates 
easy access and participation for retail shareholders in various meetings of pub-
lic companies.73 In a press release, ISA Chairman Shmuel Hauser reiterated the 
                                                
67  See, for example, the eBallot, which is described by its creators as the top electronic vot-
ing system in the world. See EBALLOT, www.eballot.com [https://perma.cc/2Q98-VK59] 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
68  European Union Directive, supra note 16, at § 8. 
69  See Ellen Kelleher, Turkey Moves First on E-Voting, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2012), 
https://www.ft.com/content/2a13afde-0e2e-11e2-8d92-00144feabdc0 
[https://perma.cc/RHN6-GVLY]. 
70  Melsa Ararat & Muzaffer Eroğlu, Istanbul Stock Exchange Moves First on Mandatory 
Electronic Voting at General Meetings of Shareholders 1, 2–3 (Oct. 2, 2012), https://pa 
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2172964 [https://perma.cc/DSH4-3ZMZ]. 
71  Shareholders Get Online Control, BUS. TODAY (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.businessto 
day.in/moneytoday/perspective/sebis-e-voting-rule-allows-more-say-to-shareholders/story/1 
86668.html [https://perma.cc/PHE6-45TD] (article alternately entitled Sebi’s E-Voting Rule 
Allows More Say to Shareholders). 
72  See id. 
73  See generally Press Release, Israel Sec. Auth., Israel Securities Authority Launches an 
Electronic Voting System (June 29, 2015), http://www.isa.gov.il/sites/ISAEng/1489/1511/Pa 
ges/The-Israel-Securities-Authority-Launches-an-Electronic-Voting-System.aspx [https://per 
ma.cc/87KP-TRBH]. The Israel Securities Authority, acting as a regulator entrusted with 
protecting the interests of investors, initiated the electronic voting system and bears the costs 
of its implementation and operation. For investors and whoever calls for a shareholder meet-
 
17 NEV. L.J. 739 SOLOMON - FINAL.DOCX 5/10/17  2:54 PM 
Summer 2017] THE VOICE 755 
need for this voting option, stating that “it is important for the public who owns 
securities to be able to play an active role and exercise [its] rights as a partner 
in public corporations.”74 
But does shareholder voice really matter? Is corporate democracy, as mani-
fested in the involvement of minority shareholders in the decision-making of 
companies with a controlling shareholder, actually desirable? Is the rational ap-
athy of investors in public companies truly a problematic phenomenon that re-
quires regulatory intervention? The normative discussion in Part III addresses 
these fundamental issues. 
III.   THE NORMATIVE DISCUSSION: DOES VOICE REALLY MATTER? 
A.   Voice Versus Exit 
According to Hirschman’s conceptualization in his classic Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty, there are two main courses of action available to shareholders that 
grow dissatisfied with a corporation’s performance and management: sell their 
shares and invest in another corporation (“exit”) or communicate their opinion 
by voting (“voice”).75 Exit will influence the share price and signal to both 
management and the stock market the investors’ dissatisfaction with the corpo-
ration’s decision-making and performance;76 voice will enable the shareholders 
to exert influence and change the corporation’s course of action.77 
Rational apathy usually causes shareholders to forego the option of voice 
or any other form of active involvement and instead to follow a more passive 
pattern of investment.78 Due to their limited influence on the voting outcome at 
general meetings and the relative costliness of exercising their right to vote, re-
tail shareholders prefer to express their discontent by voting with their feet, i.e., 
by selling their shares, rather than by voting with their hands at the general 
meeting. This tendency to vote with their feet has been dubbed the “Wall Street 
                                                                                                             
ing, using this voting system is completely costless. Given the concentrated structure of the 
Israeli capital market, which is dominated by a small group of families, it came as no sur-
prise that a public authority, rather than a private actor, initiated this voting system, which is 
meant to strengthen the position of public investors relative to controlling shareholders. 
74  Id. 
75  ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 4 (1970). 
76  The more shares an investor holds, the more likely her exit from the corporation will re-
sult in a significant drop in the share price and thereby inflict financial harm on her. There-
fore, the attractiveness of exit declines in direct correlation to the size of the stake an inves-
tor has in a corporation. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
77  See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 75. 
78  For an analysis of shareholders’ passivity, see Black, supra note 7, at 528, arguing that 
“[t]he shareholder impotence argument has been widely accepted by both academics and 
regulators.” 
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Walk,” referring to shareholders’ inclination to exit whenever they are dissatis-
fied with management.79 
But shareholders’ voting rights are, in fact, often compromised, and their 
ability to influence the corporation’s policies and courses of action is limited. 
Indeed, these rights, noted Justice Stevens in his dissent in Citizens United v. 
FEC,80 are “almost nonexistent, given the internal authority wielded by boards 
and managers and the expansive protections afforded by the business judgment 
rule.”81 Moreover, retail investors are significantly distanced from the public 
corporations they are invested in since most of their investments are executed 
through institutional investors.82 Thus, in order to use their voice, retail inves-
tors must pressure the relevant institutional investor (pension fund, mutual 
fund, etc.) to take action, in the hope that the latter will gain the support of oth-
er shareholders.83 
Such suboptimal circumstances can aggravate rational apathy. This raises 
the question of whether there is any value or utility to shareholder voting rights. 
My contention is that voice, which is the foundation of the shareholder’s right 
to vote, has intrinsic value regardless of its utility. This intrinsic value is sup-
ported by utilitarian reasoning, which will be discussed below, but it is inde-
pendent of any utility considerations. 
It is interesting to note that in a follow-up commentary to Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty, Hirschman explicitly expressed concern that he had been too timid in 
his advocacy of voice.84 With regard to public corporations, Hirschman noted 
that the relationship between shareholders and management is indeed dominat-
ed by exit until the corporation’s activities affect the public interest.85 In the lat-
ter instances, rather than take the “Wall Street Walk” and sell their shares in the 
corporation, shareholders exercise their influence on the corporation to try to 
change its policies.86 My claim that there is intrinsic value to a shareholder’s 
                                                
79  MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 35 (1995) (“Shareholders . . . can get out 
at any time, as long as they can find someone to buy their shares, which is easy to do in 
widely traded companies.”). 
80  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
81  Id. at 477 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted). 
82  Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Be-
tween Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 
340–41 (2015). 
83  Id. at 341. 
84  Albert O. Hirschman, Exit Voice and Loyalty: Further Reflections and a Survey of Recent 
Contributions, 58 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q.: HEALTH & SOC’Y 430, 431 (1980). 
Hirschman’s words are worth mentioning:  
I now find that my advocacy of voice was not exaggerated, but, on the contrary, too timid. This 
is not surprising. Since voice is an entirely new category for economists, . . . it will take some 
time to uncover all the situations in which the importance of voice has been underrated. 
Id. 
85  See id. at 435. 
86  Id. at 435–36. 
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right to vote and that voice, therefore, matters regardless of the circumstances, 
offers a novel approach to Hirschman’s voice and exit dichotomy. 
B.   The Intrinsic Value of Shareholder Voting Rights 
The shareholder’s right to vote, which epitomizes Hirschman’s notion of 
voice, is treated by courts as a fundamental right and, consequently, is accorded 
special status and protection. In Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp.,87 for exam-
ple, the Delaware Court of Chancery famously declared that “courts have long 
exercised a most sensitive and protective regard for the free and effective exer-
cise of [shareholder] voting rights” and held shareholders’ right to exercise 
their franchise to be fundamental.88 But what makes shareholder suffrage a fun-
damental right? The Blasius court grounded this assertion on purely theoretical 
statements.89 Chancellor Allen noted that the right to vote is critical to the “the-
ory that legitimates” the exercise of power by directors and managers over 
property that they do not own.90 He continued this line of argument by contend-
ing that “[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon 
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”91 
Scholars were puzzled by the reasoning in Blasius,92 with some even dis-
missing Allen’s statements as ipse dixit.93 However, in MM Companies,94 the 
Supreme Court of Delaware embraced some of the theoretical statements made 
in Blasius, noting that shareholder franchise can, indeed, be “characterized as 
the ‘ideological underpinning’ upon which the legitimacy of the directors man-
agerial power rests.”95 Moreover, the Court urged that the judiciary be “assidu-
ous in carefully reviewing any board actions designed to interfere with or im-
pede the effective exercise of corporate democracy by shareholders.”96 
                                                
87  Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
88  Id. at 659 n.2, 663. 
89  See Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen’s Jurisprudence and the Theory of Corporate 
Law, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683, 694 (1992) (“Allen recognizes an important distinction be-
tween doctrine and theory, as in Blasius, where he explicitly acknowledged the distinction 
between arguments that are based on theoretical considerations and those based on doctrinal 
considerations.” (footnotes omitted)). 
90  Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659. 
91  Id. 
92  See, e.g., Andrew C. Houston, Blasius and the Democratic Paradigm in Corporate Law, 
17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 843, 848–49 (1992) (“Blasius’ legitimacy argument is brief, eloquent 
and puzzling. . . . [I]t is clear that Blasius rejects any functional justification of corporate vot-
ing. It is less clear what view it proposes to replace it with.”). 
93  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Responses, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disem-
powerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1749 n.74 (2006). 
94  MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003). 
95  Id. at 1126. 
96  Id. at 1127. 
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Reference to mechanisms of corporate democracy can also be found in the 
Citizens United ruling.97 Justice Kennedy held that the mechanisms of corpo-
rate democracy—which are essentially mechanisms of voice—enable share-
holders to respond to the corporation’s political speech “in a proper way.”98 
Without the right to vote, shareholders would not be able to hold management 
accountable for how it exercises its First Amendment rights.99 Kennedy noted 
that shareholders use corporate democracy mechanisms to ensure that “their 
corporation’s political speech advances [their] interest in making profits.”100 
Since the maximization of shareholders’ profits is supposed to be the corpora-
tion’s primary goal,101 shareholder suffrage should be regarded as a fundamen-
tal right that forms the basis of the corporation’s raison d’être. 
Justice Kennedy’s statements in Citizens United should not be interpreted 
narrowly. The threat of replacement that directors and officers face given 
shareholders’ right to vote incentivizes them to align their interests with those 
of the shareholders. This could certainly lead to greater efficiency and in-
creased financial returns.102 But it has an even greater significance: only with 
the alignment of the directors’ interests and shareholder interests can corporate 
democracy be fully realized. 
Some scholars, however, regard corporate democracy and shareholders’ 
rights to be negligibly efficient or relevant. Bainbridge has claimed that “share-
holder[s’] control rights are so weak that they scarcely qualify as part of corpo-
rate governance.”103 Even proponents of corporate democracy, who support 
greater shareholder power and participation in the corporation’s decision-
making process, concede that the scope of shareholders’ rights is rather limited. 
For example, Lucian A. Bebchuk, a leading advocate of empowering share-
holders, referred to the Blasius ruling in an article ominously entitled The Myth 
of the Shareholder Franchise and noted that “shareholders do not in fact have 
at their disposal those ‘powers of corporate democracy.’ ”104 
I propose instead a novel perspective on the corporate democracy debate. 
The true extent of the shareholder franchise is, at this point in my discussion, 
irrelevant; rather than utilitarian, the legitimacy argument should be viewed as 
deontological. Corporate democracy and the exercise of voting rights are not 
                                                
97  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010). 
98  Id. at 370–71. 
99  Id. at 371. 
100  Id. at 370. 
101  Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A 
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1993). 
102  See infra Part III.C.1. 
103  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Govern-
ance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 569 (2003). 
104  Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 676 
(2007). 
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merely an intentional product or accidental consequence of corporate law. 
There is no legal definition as to what legitimacy and “ideological underpin-
ning” are meant to be or to achieve, but rather, the corporation’s legitimacy is 
the basis of corporate law, upon which rules should be designed and developed. 
A public corporation is at its core founded on the notion of public legitimacy. 
Ownership and control may be separated under modern corporate theory,105 but 
it is the implicit or explicit consent of the owners of the corporation—i.e., the 
shareholders—that legitimizes managers’ exercise of control.106 On purely de-
ontological reasoning, the legitimacy argument mandates that without the 
mechanisms of corporate democracy, the public corporation is stripped of its 
ideological foundation and, accordingly, its legitimacy. 
It should be stressed that the promotion of shareholders’ voting rights—
and, moreover, of corporate democracy—need not be driven by some notion of 
civic democracy. “ ‘Democracy’ is a powerful word in America,” and this can 
certainly explain why many legal scholars are prone to drawing a parallel be-
tween corporate democracy and political democracy.107 Yet, I maintain, it is the 
intrinsic value of the shareholder’s right to vote that forms the foundation of 
corporate law, not civic notions of democracy. 
C.   The Efficiency of Voting Rights 
Thus far, the discussion has centered on the deontological rationale for the 
shareholder’s right to vote. However, to complete this discussion, utilitarian ra-
tionales must be addressed. Indeed, the right to vote is efficient because it re-
duces agency costs and contributes to the development of financial markets. 
                                                
105  See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 42, at 119. 
106  Interestingly, in a questionnaire survey on the reasons for increasing retail shareholders’ 
participation in general meetings, the most prevalent response given by large German com-
panies listed on the DAX30 was ensuring a high level of legitimacy for decisions passed at 
shareholder meetings. Bernd Beuthel, Electronic Corporate Governance: Online and Virtual 
Shareholder Meetings and Shareholder Participation in Switzerland and Germany 108–09 
(June 12, 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of St. Gallen), 
http://www1.unisg.ch/www/edis.nsf/SysLkpByIdentifier/3195/$FILE/dis3195.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/96F9-Z2KK]. One-third of these respondents chose legitimacy as a reason 
for why they view high shareholder participation in their general meetings to be important. 
Id. 
107  See Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1389 (2006). Rodrigues concludes that a “[c]omparison of 
political voting to corporate voting provides a useful vehicle for understanding the character-
istics of each more fully. The danger lies in taking principles from the civic polity and apply-
ing them to the corporate polity without considering the different context of each.” Id. at 
1406. 
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1.    Lowering Agency Costs 
Corporations are typically plagued by agency problems.108 Whether be-
tween managers and shareholders or between a controlling shareholder and mi-
nority shareholders, this can lead to the expropriation of funds and assets, 
which can take many forms.109 For example, corporation insiders (controlling 
shareholders or managers) might simply steal from the corporation.110 Alterna-
tively, they can over-pay themselves and divert investment opportunities from 
the corporation to independent business entities under their full control.111 The 
corporation’s insiders might also sell shares in the corporation to a business en-
tity they own below the market price or install unqualified family members in 
managerial positions.112 Regardless, however, all types of expropriation amount 
to what some scholars describe as theft.113 
Obviously, agency problems do not only lead to the expropriation of funds 
and assets. Managers might simply steer the corporation away from wealth-
maximizing activities in order to avoid risks. Since excessive risk could even-
tually lead to failure and replacement, managers may promote conservative 
business strategies, which will secure their employment but will also deprive 
shareholders of potential profits. In contrast, shareholders, due to their diversi-
fied portfolios,114 can bear higher risks and are therefore more amenable to risk-
ier business strategies that serve profit maximization. 
A commonly held view is that managers in controlled companies are su-
pervised and reined in by large shareholders, who wield control over the corpo-
ration’s assets as well as have an interest in maximizing profits.115 However, in 
practice, the agency problems in controlled companies may actually be aggra-
vated. To begin with, the controlling shareholder’s interests may not be aligned 
with the interests of other shareholders. Thus, she may use her control in the 
corporation to advance self-dealing transactions. Moreover, the controller may 
be dependent on management’s cooperation to “tunnel” resources from the cor-
poration, for managers are usually in charge of initiating related-party transac-
                                                
108  See Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate Govern-
ance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 251, 251 (2014) (“Since Professors Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. 
Means’s classic book of 1932, the agency costs of corporate governance have played a cen-
tral role in discussions about corporate law. . . . In modern terms, corporations are beset with 
agency problems.” (footnote omitted)); see also supra Part I. 
109  For a comprehensive account of the many forms of expropriation, see Rafael La Porta et 
al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000). 
110  Id. at 4. 
111  Posner & Weyl, supra note 108, at 252. 
112  La Porta et al., supra note 109, at 4. 
113  Id. (“[T]ransfer pricing, asset stripping, and investor dilution, though often legal, have 
largely the same effect as theft.”). 
114  See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
115  Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 
754 (1997). 
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tions and submitting them to the board for approval.116 Therefore, in controlled 
companies, the main concern is not that managers will promote proposals that 
diverge from the interests of shareholders in general but rather that they will 
back initiatives that divert value from the minority shareholders to the control-
ler.117 Furthermore, controlling shareholders may lack the incentive to rein in or 
monitor managers for personal reasons. For example, some controllers may be 
biased in their judgment due to their longstanding relationship with the corpo-
ration’s managers.118 Such bias could impair or even prevent any willingness on 
the controller’s part to constrain management.  
Given these many dimensions of the agency problem, it is hardly surprising 
that large sections of corporate law are aimed at minimizing agency costs.119 
For example, voting rights can be understood as simply a mechanism for reduc-
ing agency costs, for the right to vote improves both corporate governance and 
accountability.120 Improved accountability, which often goes hand-in-hand with 
greater transparency, lowers agency costs because directors and officers must 
strive to align their interests with those of the shareholders in order to avoid re-
placement.121 This alignment leads to greater efficiency and increased financial 
returns, as it serves to neutralize insiders’ ex-ante incentive to self-deal or ex-
propriate funds.122 
In addition, lowering agency costs through the mechanisms of corporate 
democracy impacts the capital market as well. Agency costs reduce the value of 
corporations and, thereby, the total return on investors’ market portfolios.123 
Not surprisingly, investors discount the price of shares to reflect the agency 
costs, resulting in an increase in the cost of capital for corporations.124 Investors 
will apply lower discounts, however, if agency costs are reduced, which will 
lead to a lower cost of capital for corporations and thus benefit the market in 
general.125 
                                                
116  Kobi Kastiel, Executive Compensation in Controlled Companies, 90 IND. L.J. 1131, 
1142–43 (2015). 
117  Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 1295. 
118  Kastiel, supra note 116, at 1139. 
119  Posner & Weyl, supra note 108. 
120  Kastiel & Nili, supra note 12, at 60. 
121  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (“Shareholder ob-
jections raised through the procedures of corporate democracy . . . can be more effective to-
day because modern technology makes disclosures rapid and informative. . . . With the ad-
vent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens 
with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their 
positions and supporters.”). 
122  See Black, supra note 25. 
123  Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 
DUKE L.J. 711, 753 (2006). 
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
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2.   Promoting the Development of Financial Markets 
Shareholder participation in the corporate decision-making process is not 
merely a mechanism of oversight designed to enhance accountability and to re-
duce agency costs. It also serves to protect investor rights and, consequently, to 
boost public trust in the stock market. Shareholder voting should therefore be 
viewed as instrumental to the development of financial markets. 
Shareholder participation in the decision-making process supports the free 
exchange of views and ideas among investors and enables retail shareholders to 
acquire knowledge and expertise. Greater knowledge and expertise, in turn, 
supports the capital market as a whole. Sophisticated investors, aware of their 
rights, maximize general shareholder wealth and prevent expropriation or ex-
ploitation by controlling shareholders. 
Moreover, safeguarding shareholder rights increases investors’ willingness 
to invest in corporations126 and, consequently, expands the pool of financial re-
sources available for production and growth.127 Indeed, studies have shown a 
compelling correlation between the protection afforded to investors and the de-
velopment of capital markets.128 In countries with an investor-friendly legal en-
vironment that protects against expropriation by controllers, the markets thrive 
and flourish.129 In contrast, countries that offer investors relatively weak legal 
protection have smaller and less developed capital markets.130 
Shareholder activism and participation in general meetings are clearly im-
portant in stock markets where a significant number of corporations are con-
trolled by a shareholder with less than 50 percent of the voting rights.131 In the-
se markets, frequent and significant participation in shareholder meetings by 
investors could increase overall public trust in the stock market. As discussed at 
length above, one of the dire consequences of rational apathy is that the deci-
sions passed at general meetings might not reflect the views of all the share-
holders or even those of the majority of the shareholders. Rather, the decisions 
will tend to serve only the controlling shareholder’s positions and proposals 
                                                
126  Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 26. 
127  Development of financial markets is positively related to economic growth. See, e.g., 
Guglielmo Maria Caporale et al., Stock Market Development and Economic Growth: The 
Causal Linkage, 29 J. ECON. DEV. 33 (2004); Akinlo A. Enisan & Akinlo O. Olufisayo, 
Stock Market Development and Economic Growth: Evidence from Seven Sub-Sahara African 
Countries, 61 J. ECON. & BUS. 162 (2009); Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, 
Banks, and Economic Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 537 (1998); Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, 
Stock Market Development and Long-Run Growth, 10 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 323 (1996). 
128  See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 
1131 (1997). 
129  Id. at 1149. 
130  Id. at 1131. 
131  For data on the prominence in the United States of companies with controlling share-
holders with less than 50 percent of the voting rights, see Anderson et al., supra note 5; An-
derson & Reeb, supra note 5; Holderness, supra note 5, at 1378. 
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even though she holds less than 50 percent of the voting rights. The controller 
can vote her entire block of shares in favor of her own initiatives, while the ra-
tional apathy of investors will make blocking initiatives that benefit the control-
ler at the expense of retail shareholders nearly or completely impossible.132 
Since decisions adopted at the general meeting do not necessarily reflect the 
opinions of public investors, the public trust in the capital market is impaired. 
Providing investors with legal mechanisms to prevent controlling shareholders 
and managers from engaging in self-dealing is, therefore, a prerequisite for a 
strong securities market.133 
Moreover, minority shareholders’ participating in general meetings and ex-
ercising their voting rights are important even in companies where the control-
ling shareholder holds more than 50 percent of the voting rights. This is espe-
cially true following a recent case that strengthened minority shareholder voice 
in going-private mergers.134 In M&F Worldwide,135 the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that freeze-out mergers structured with dual procedural protec-
tions—negotiated by a well-functioning special committee of independent di-
rectors and approved by the majority of the minority shareholders—should be 
reviewed under the highly deferential business judgment standard instead of the 
highest level of scrutiny—the entire fairness review.136 The M&F Worldwide 
decision strengthened the voice of minority shareholders by providing a strong 
incentive for the controlling shareholder to approve the transaction by a fully 
informed majority-of-the-minority vote.137 
D.   The Case Against Corporate Democracy 
Corporate democracy has many detractors, who claim that the sharehold-
er’s right to vote is an evil and not inevitably a necessary one. Arguments 
against corporate democracy range from the theoretical to the economic, with 
most of its opponents maintaining that shareholder activism could prevent the 
corporation’s controlling shareholder or managers from making sound and effi-
cient business decisions. Thus, it is argued, shareholder activism, through the 
                                                
132  A distortion of incentives may be created since controllers who hold less (and sometimes 
substantially less) than 50 percent of the equity capital bear only a fraction of the negative 
effects of their actions on the firm’s cash flow, but they can capture the full private benefits 
of their actions. See Claessens et al., supra note 36, at 2741–43 and accompanying text; Lins, 
supra note 36, at 159–60 and accompanying text. 
133  See Black, supra note 25. 
134  In a going-private merger, a corporation’s controlling shareholder attempts to buy the 
remainder of the corporation’s widely held shares from minority shareholders using the 
mechanism of a “statutory merger.” See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(a)–(c) (2016). 
135  Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). 
136  Id. at 635, 644. 
137  See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 528 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
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mechanisms of corporate democracy, could impair the corporation’s ability to 
maximize its shareholders’ profits. 
In this section, I will explore these arguments against corporate democracy, 
raising certain reservations and counterclaims that offer a new perspective in 
the scholarly debate over the shareholder’s right to vote. 
1.   Freedom of Contract Versus Corporate Democracy 
Many scholars take a voluntary approach to corporate democracy: manag-
ers and shareholders should be allowed to opt out of any limitations on their 
freedom of action. This approach’s conception is firmly grounded in freedom 
of contract.138 In extremis, advocates of the contractual approach to corporate 
law, who view the public corporation as a “nexus of contracts,”139 might be 
willing to do away with all constraints and mandatory rules that limit the ability 
of managers and shareholders to shape their legal relationship. According to 
Daniel R. Fischel, for example, the corporation “consist[s] of contractual rela-
tionships freely entered into by economic actors to maximize their joint wel-
fare.”140 From this perspective, voting rights are a mere matter of private con-
tract between the corporation and its investors.141 
This contractual approach to corporate law is not flawless, however. First 
and foremost, there is no formal contract between shareholders and the firm or 
its managers, nor is there consent. Even if we were to accept that a contract is 
entered into, it would be in large part a construct of positive law.142 Thus, 
shareholders do not formally or consciously consent to giving the firm or its 
managers controlling power and discretion through a contract per se. Moreover, 
can a contract truly exist among the thousands of individual shareholders of the 
modern international corporation, who have never met, speak different lan-
                                                
138  For the pioneering works that laid the foundations for the contractual theory of the firm, 
see generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 28. 
For the contractual theory of the firm, see generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1–39 (1991); Steven N. S. Cheung, 
The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1983). 
139  William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 407, 409 (1989). 
The new economic theory’s core notion describes the firm as a legal fiction that serves as a 
nexus for a set of contracting relations among individual factors of production. . . . Some have 
accorded this notion the weight of scientific truth: It has been received in the legal literature as 
an ontological discovery with immediate and significant implications for corporate law dis-
course. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  
140  Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common 
Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 140 (1987). 
141  Id. (“Who has the right to vote and how and when the vote can be exercised are rights 
that are typically allocated by contract.”). 
142  Bratton, Jr., supra note 139, at 462. 
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guages, and have different motives and loyalties?143 Obviously, a contract per 
se cannot be said to exist in such circumstances, and implicit or explicit consent 
on the part of shareholders is just as fictitious. 
Second, under the conception of the corporation as a nexus of contracts—
and of every shareholder consenting to contract with the corporation or its 
agents—any changes to the corporation’s certificate of incorporation or bylaws 
(and, indeed, many other changes to the original consent) must be approved by 
all the shareholders, as mandated by contract law.144 However, not only is this 
unfeasible, it is also not required under corporate law. 
Finally, corporate law already limits freedom of contract. Rules prohibiting 
fraud,145 imposing fiduciary duties,146 and requiring approval by a majority of 
votes147 are all accepted norms. Thus, freedom of contract is a priori restricted 
under corporate law; furthermore, shareholders can even regard these mandato-
ry rules as the true contract upon which their relationship with the firm is 
founded.148 As suggested by Joel Seligman, then, given that market forces are 
imperfect, the nexus-of-contracts approach to corporate law loses its analytical 
value.149 
 Indeed, some may argue that modern contract law has moved away from 
any formal requirements regarding offer and acceptance or consent. Some may 
argue that under modern contract law, contracting parties do not need to adhere 
to anachronistic notions of formalism. However, the flaws of the nexus-of-
contracts approach are not limited to the narrow definitions and requirements of 
contract law or to any subsequent notions of formalism. 
                                                
143  See Alan Wolfe, The Modern Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor?, 50 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1673, 1680 (1993). 
144  Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable 
Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1823 (1989) (“charter 
amendments, which do not require unanimous consent by all shareholders, cannot be viewed 
as a contract”). 
145  The Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a–77aa (2012)) imposes various requirements and prohibitions on publicly traded cor-
porations, for example, requiring that they provide investors with financial information re-
garding securities, id. § 10, and prohibiting fraudulent transactions, id. § 17. 
146  For example, see the duty of loyalty under section 144(a) of the Delaware General Cor-
poration Law, according to which a contract or transaction between a corporation and one or 
more of its directors or officers will be afforded protection against challenge if, inter alia, it 
is approved in good faith. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2016). 
147  For example, see the rules for amending the certificate of incorporation under section 242 
of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Id. § 242. 
148  Joel Seligman, Essay, The Case for Federal Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. 
L. REV. 947, 949 (1990) (“[I]t is reasonable to assume that most shareholders would view 
federal securities fraud and state corporate law derivative actions—rather than a hypothetical 
contract—as their basic protection against managerial misconduct.”). 
149  Id. 
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First, prominent scholars who have shown reverence to the nexus-of-
contracts approach admit that it is somewhat flawed. For example, Stephen 
Bainbridge has written that just like Newtonian physics, contractarianism does 
not provide an accurate representation of reality, and should rather be viewed 
as a model that explains only some phenomena—albeit a large and important 
set of phenomena.150 
Second, and more importantly, the nexus-of-contracts approach neglects to 
address important aspects of the modern corporation. For example, some schol-
ars point to the dual nature of the corporation. While a firm is indeed constitut-
ed of many voluntary arrangements, e.g., between the management and debtors, 
it is also a bureaucratic hierarchy with rules that are not a by-product of recip-
rocal arrangements.151 The nexus-of-contracts conception captures only one of 
these two aspects of the corporation. Adopting a theory that describes only one 
aspect of the dual nature of the modern corporation does little to promote the 
understanding of the reality of corporate law.152 
Finally, even if one should adopt the nexus-of-contracts approach, it is ad-
vised to discern its positive propositions from any normative implications. As 
noted by Melvin A. Eisenberg, referring to Bainbridge’s insight on the implica-
tions of the nexus-of-contracts approach on the role of mandatory legal rules in 
corporate law, “[t]o reason from the nexus-of-contracts conception to a rejec-
tion of mandatory legal rules is to mistakenly reason from is to ought.”153 Thus, 
and even if it is conceived as an accurate descriptive model, the nexus-of-
contracts approach lacks any normative basis—a normative basis that this arti-
cle strives to put forward. 
2.   Short-Termism Versus Long-Termism 
A recurring argument against corporate democracy relates to retail share-
holders’ investment horizon. While controlling shareholders invest for the long 
                                                
150  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique 
of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 871 (1997) (reviewing 
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (1995)) (“[T]he nexus-of-contracts model is properly viewed 
as a metaphor rather than as a positive account of economic reality. Contractarianism is 
analogous to Newtonian physics, which no longer claims to be an accurate representation of 
the laws of physics, but yet provides a simple model that adequately explains a large and im-
portant set of physical phenomena.”). 
151  Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and 
the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 820 (1999). 
152  Id. at 829–30 (“To describe and understand firms purely as bureaucratic hierarchical or-
ganizations misses the voluntary element of many of the arrangements that constitute a firm. 
To describe firms purely as a set of reciprocal arrangements misses the extent to which firms 
are organized by bureaucratic rules and operate by hierarchical directions issued by superiors 
to subordinates.”). 
153  Id. at 824. 
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term, retail shareholders are seeking only short-term profits.154 Thus, the latter 
have an interest in short-term maximization of the value of the company, even 
if maximizing short-term value causes harm to the company in the long run—
so long as the long-term damage is not reflected in the short-term share price, 
they do not care. In contrast, a controller cannot hide long-term risk, since sell-
ing her controlling block of shares is contingent on due diligence. Therefore, a 
controlling shareholder will make decisions based on their long-term impact on 
the company. 
A commonly held view is that corporate law should not promote the inter-
ests of short-term investors but should rather strive to support long-term share-
holder value.155 Two prominent judges on the Delaware Supreme Court, for ex-
ample, have expressed concern in articles about the consequences of investors’ 
short-termism and urged managers to promote the long-term interests of inves-
tors.156 According to this approach, it can be argued that promoting retail share-
holder suffrage will lead to suboptimal decisions that are rooted in short-term 
interests and will cause harm to the company’s long-term interests.157 
However, I contend, this approach does not reflect reality. A significant 
proportion of the public’s investment in publicly traded companies is managed 
by institutional investors.158 Pension funds and life insurance companies are 
characterized by a long-term investment horizon, which allows them to meet 
their long-term obligations.159 Empirical studies show that institutional owner-
ship is associated with higher long-term investment, such as research and de-
                                                
154  Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 561, 579 (2006). 
155  Hansmann & Kraakman state decisively that “[t]here is no longer any serious competitor 
to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder 
value.” Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 26, at 439; see also John H. Matheson & Brent 
A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, Relationship Management, and the Trialogical Impera-
tive for Corporate Law, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (1994) (“[T]he raison d’être of large 
publicly held corporations is to maximize ‘longterm shareholder’ and corporate value.” 
(footnote omitted)); Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital 
Investment System, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1992, https://hbr.org/1992/09/capital-
disadvantage-americas-failing-capital-investment-system [https://perma.cc/3Q6L-AZZG] 
(“[L]ong-term shareholder value should be identified as the explicit corporate goal.”). 
156  Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 68 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1649–50 (2011); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate 
Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless 
Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 10, 17–18 
(2010). 
157  The economic and legal literature discusses critical problems created by short-term inter-
ests of shareholders. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and 
Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 267–71 (2012); Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, 
What Good Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2012, https://hbr.org/2012/07/ 
what-good-are-shareholders [https://perma.cc/M6CB-E66Q]. 
158  See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
159  Anabtawi, supra note 154, at 564. 
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velopment (“R&D”) expenditure.160 One study surveying 2500 companies 
found a strong correlation between institutional share ownership and expendi-
tures for property, plant, and equipment (“PP&E”) and R&D.161 Another study, 
based on data collected from 129 companies, also found a positive correlation 
between institutional ownership and R&D expenditure.162 These findings refute 
the premise that institutional investors push managers into adopting myopic 
policies aimed at reaping quick profits. Instead, it emerges that institutional in-
vestors seek long-term economic results from the companies they invest in.163 
Even regarding investors that are more likely to be concerned about the 
short-term value of their investments, such as hedge funds,164 it seems that the 
criticism of their activism is unjustified. Findings from recent studies have un-
dermined the prevailing view that activist shareholders, seeking short-term 
profits, cause harm to the company in the long run. According to Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, this view is not supported by the empirical findings, which show that 
activist shareholders benefit the company in both the short term and long 
term.165 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang conducted a study of 
approximately 2,000 activist shareholders’ initiatives and found that they had 
improved the performance of the relevant companies not only in the short term, 
but also in the five years following the intervention of the activist sharehold-
ers.166 Moreover, Jesse Fried has called into doubt the prevailing view that a 
firm’s managers should favor long-term shareholders over short-term share-
holders.167 According to Fried, managers serving long-term shareholders may 
well destroy more economic value than managers serving short-term share-
holders.168 
3.   No Knowledge, No Vote?  
Another argument contesting the desirability of retail shareholders’ exer-
cising their voting rights derives from the common preconception that these 
                                                
160  Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 
BUS. LAW. 977, 993–96 (2013). 
161  Sunil Wahal & John J. McConnell, Do Institutional Investors Exacerbate Managerial 
Myopia?, 6 J. CORP. FIN. 307, 310 (2000). 
162  Gary S. Hansen & Charles W. L. Hill, Are Institutional Investors Myopic? A Time-Series 
Study of Four Technology-Driven Industries, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1, 6, 9 (1991). 
163  See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor 
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 862–64 (1992). 
164  Anabtawi, supra note 154, at 564. 
165  Lucian A. Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1638–43 (2013). 
166  Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2015). 
167  Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 
1554, 1557 (2015). 
168  Id. 
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shareholders lack expertise, information, and knowledge relative to the control-
ling shareholder and management.169 In contrast to controlling shareholders and 
managers, who have access to inside and private information about the corpora-
tion’s affairs, retail shareholders are characterized by an informational defi-
ciency. Even with regard to information that is in the public domain and acces-
sible to all, retail shareholders lack the motivation and professional skills 
necessary to properly analyze the information and to make informed deci-
sions.170 Moreover, retail shareholders, who are less involved in the corpora-
tion’s affairs than controlling shareholders and management, are susceptible to 
manipulation in their decision-making.171 Actors with ulterior motives or con-
flicting interests can take advantage of these shareholders’ lack of information 
regarding the corporation. This forms the basis to the argument that retail 
shareholders might make wrong or suboptimal decisions that will not maximize 
their profits. 
These arguments, I propose, are not convincing. First, opponents of share-
holder primacy and bolstering shareholder voting rights attribute to controlling 
shareholders, directors, and managers what seems to be divine wisdom, while 
reducing the retail shareholders to an ignorant mass. Yet controlling sharehold-
ers and managers, in fact, have no such wisdom, and retail shareholders in no 
way resemble a blind mob. In fact, the multitude of retail shareholders may be 
wiser than the controlling shareholder or the (few) elected directors. Aristotle 
has been attributed with the insight that “the wisdom of the multitude”172—
nowadays referred to as the wisdom of the crowd173—might actually lead to 
better decisions than the wisdom of the few. Every individual has her share of 
wisdom, and when individuals join together, they combine their shares of wis-
dom: one individual will understand one part, while another will understand 
another part, and between them, they will reach an understanding of the whole. 
To apply this to our context, a retail shareholder might, indeed, understand only 
one part of a proposal up for a vote, but the shared understandings of all the 
shareholders at the general meeting will combine to enable a proper view of the 
picture in its entirety and thus lead to an informed and optimal decision by all. 
Second, a byproduct of shareholders’ general tendency to diversify their 
investments across many corporations174 is that they accumulate and enhance 
                                                
169  Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Ap-
proach to Corporate Law, 60 CIN. L. REV. 347, 353 (1991); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 668 (1996). 
170  Since retail shareholders are characterized by rational apathy, they lack incentive to gath-
er the information needed for an informed decision and to analyze it properly. See supra Part 
II. 
171  Gordon, supra note 169, at 354–55. 
172  See Jeremy Waldron, The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book III, Chap-
ter 11 of Aristotle’s Politics, 23 POL. THEORY 563, 564 (1995). 
173  See generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2005). 
174  See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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their expertise. Shareholder meetings in different corporations often deal with 
similar issues, including rules of corporate governance, which are intended to 
promote transparency and accountability in the company. Thus, shareholders, 
particularly institutional investors, acquire knowledge, experience, and exper-
tise through their investments in many corporations.175 This then enables them 
to make informed voting decisions. Therefore, at least with regard to matters 
that are frequently debated at shareholder meetings, managers and controlling 
shareholders do not necessarily wield superior knowledge or expertise as com-
pared to the minority shareholders.176 
However, even if we accept that controlling shareholders and managers en-
joy better access to information and have a higher level of expertise, there is no 
guarantee that these advantages will be applied to enhance the corporation’s 
decision-making process in a way that will maximize the aggregate shareholder 
wealth. Quite the contrary: a controlling shareholder might exploit her superior 
information and knowledge to advance courses of action that serve her interests 
but conflict with the interests of the corporation or its investors. This better ac-
cess to information might enable the controlling shareholder or managers to de-
rive private benefit by diverting funds into their own pockets, away from the 
corporation and its shareholders.177 Shareholders can exercise their voting 
rights to thwart such underhanded maneuvering. In this way, the agency prob-
lem between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders will be kept 
at bay. 
Finally, the arguments against reinforcing corporate democracy reflect an 
instrumental approach to the shareholder franchise: namely, shareholders’ par-
ticipation in the corporation’s decision-making process is desirable only if it 
enhances the end result, i.e., leads to better decisions. However, as discussed, 
there is intrinsic value to shareholders’ exercising their voting rights, irrespec-
tive of outcome.178 Corporate democracy mechanisms and, specifically, share-
holders’ voting rights, legitimize both the public corporation as a whole and the 
authority vested in its controlling shareholder, directors, and managers. Under 
this intrinsic-value approach, minority shareholders should not be deprived of 
their right to vote at shareholder meetings due to a deficiency of information, 
knowledge, or expertise relative to the controlling shareholder. 
CONCLUSION 
In his reflections on Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Hirschman considered the 
curious nature of voice: “[W]hile normally felt as a chore and a cost which one 
                                                
175  Black, supra note 163, at 852–53. 
176  Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
833, 881 (2005). 
177  See supra Part I. 
178  See supra Part III.B. 
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tries to minimize or shirk, the activities connected with voice can on occasion 
become a highly desired end in itself.”179 This article has made the novel claim 
that in corporate law, voice is indeed a highly desired end in and of itself. Re-
gardless of any constraints or consequences, the shareholder’s right to vote 
constitutes the very foundation on which the public corporation is built and sus-
tained. Without corporate democracy, the public corporation is public in name 
only. Indeed, the legitimacy of the power wielded by the public corporation’s 
insiders hinges on the mechanisms of voice and, in particularly, the sharehold-
er’s right to vote.  
The discussion in this article has demonstrated how crucial exercising vot-
ing rights is in controlled companies. Without corporate democracy, minority 
shareholders are represented by the controlling shareholder, whose interests are 
not identical to theirs, and may even conflict. This is particularly troubling in 
companies in which the controlling shareholder holds less than 50 percent of 
the shares, for given the rational apathy of investors, the decisions passed at 
shareholder meetings might not reflect the positions of the majority of share-
holders. 
But this article contributes to the corporate democracy debate not only by 
introducing an important insight regarding the deontological nature of the 
shareholder’s right to vote. In exploring the consequences of agency problems 
and shareholders’ rational apathy, the discussion reveals the efficiency of pro-
moting shareholders’ voting rights in lowering agency costs and strengthening 
capital markets in general. The discussion also challenges the arguments com-
monly made for restricting the shareholder’s right to vote, showing that they 
are neither theoretically convincing nor supported by the empirical research.  
Since controlled companies predominate in capital markets around the 
world, the insights offered in this article should not be taken as solely theoreti-
cal. Rather, this article has laid out for policymakers an important and thought-
provoking normative basis for designing reforms that will incentivize minority 








                                                
179  Hirschman, supra note 84, at 432. Interestingly, Hirschman’s reappraisal of the use of 
voice was, by his own account, a result of political upheaval: “It took the explosion of pro-
test activities after the Cambodia invasion and the Kent State shootings to remind me that, in 
certain situations, the use of voice can suddenly become a most sought-after, fulfilling activi-
ty, in fact, the ultimate justification of human existence.” Id. 
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